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Report of the Hybrid Security Governance in Africa Terminal Project 
Conference 
Overview 
The terminal conference of the Hybrid Security Governance in Africa research 
project (HSG) was held in Accra, Ghana, from 21-22 July 2017. As with previous 
gatherings, it was organised by the African Security Sector Network (ASSN) with 
support from the International Development Research Centre (IDRC). 
 
Begun in early 2013, the HSG emerged from acknowledged tensions between SSR’s 
preponderant focus on state mechanisms despite growing recognition of the 
involvement of non-state security actors and of reciprocal influences between both 
groups. The project thus set out, guided by the underlisted broad research 
questions, to research the ‘complex amalgam of formal and informal, statutory and 
non-statutory actors and institutions’ which together constitute what it terms 
‘hybrid security orders’.  
 
1. How do informal norms, solidarities and networks become embedded in the 
official security, policing and justice institutions of African states? In what 
ways are they instrumentalised by elites? And in what ways does this 
influence their capacity to provide security and protect the rights of 
citizens?  
2. What roles do ‘non-state’ or ‘informal’ actors and institutions play in 
security, policing and justice; and how do they interface with the formal 
security institutions of the state? 
3. What is the impact of hybrid security orders on the security and entitlements 
of citizens in African states and in particular on vulnerable and excluded 
people and communities? In what ways if any do they foster more effective, 
equitable and accountable security provision?  Or do they instead reinforce 
existing inequalities and local-level disempowerment?  
4. How can effective, inclusive and accountable security, policing and justice 
be negotiated in contexts of hybridity and informality, and foster new forms 
of public authority better suited to African realities?  
Insecurity in Mali and Sudan pared an original list of eight countries down to six: 
Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone (two papers), Somaliland, and South 
Africa. A detailed project description, periodic meeting reports (includes agendas 
and participant lists), and all knowledge products from the HSG can be accessed 
free online from the ASSN website 
http://africansecuritynetwork.org/assn/research/ 
 
At this final convening in addition to regular project members, researchers and 
advisors, the team was pleased to welcome and engage with a multinational mix of 
activists, academics, and regional policymakers who contributed actively and 
critically to the enriching discussions. Following presentations and discussions of the 
various country case studies, participants focused on considerations of the 
implications for their respective work of the findings from the project. The central 
outcomes of this conversation are distilled on pages 26-30 and will continue to serve 
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as reflection for all participants, including the IDRC, represented by Programme 
Officer Ms. Ramata Thioune, who intimated that the research findings and 
conference outcomes would inform subsequent internal meetings at the IDRC. 
 
The keen interest shown by HSG members as well as associates during its three and 
half years span indicate the salience of the notion of hybridity in security and, as 
was remarked continually, a need for further research in an even more diverse array 

























Session I: Opening Remarks  
Two considered notions emerged from the welcome remarks by project leader, 
Professor Eboe Hutchful and Ramata Thioune, Canadian High Commissioner Heather 
Cameron being unavoidably absent. First, that hybridity in its many forms is intuitive 
to Africans, in equal part because of our cultural diversities and colonial 
experiences. Second, that the HSG project is part of a larger recent and ongoing 
intellectual rediscovery of hybridity that seeks to make sense of the crisis 
of/surrounding the Westphalian state in Africa. Both speakers enjoined the 
gathering to think about how the project’s findings might impact their work, and 
also to consider whether the project succeeded in answering the four guiding 
questions with which it set out. 
 
PRESENTATIONS  OF  RESEARCH  FINDINGS 
As previously, in the interests of space, what follows are synopses of individual 
research presentations and distillations of discussions of each case study among 
participants. All of the terminal research papers and some of the policy briefs which 
formed the bases of each presentation are accessible online at the ASSN website 
here: http://africansecuritynetwork.org/assn/research/ 
 
Session II: Gender, Justice and Security Reform 
Chair: Titilope Ajayi, University of Ghana 
Title: Women’s Access to Justice in Sierra Leone: Secret Societies and Bridging 
the Formal and Informal Divide 
Researcher/Author: Fredline M’Cormack-Hale, Seton Hall University, US 
This paper addresses hybridity within the framework of women’s access to justice, 
particularly regarding sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), which is limited 
despite years of security sector reform (SSR) in Sierra Leone. The most cited informal 
sources of security and justice are those in which men dominate—like the paramount 
chieftaincy system, which has been criticized for reflecting patriarchal values and 
perpetuating the constraints women face in accessing justice in Sierra Leone. Secret 
societies are one of a few informal spaces dominated by women. Focusing on women 
secret societies, this paper deepens discourse on hybridity and bridging the gap 
between formal and informal sources of justice in SSR, asking: 
 
• Can organisations that are primarily women based provide better 
alternatives for women to access justice?  
• Are they perceived as more legitimate than security arrangements 
encapsulated by the State?  
• Do they serve to strengthen national structures or undermine them?  
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• To what extent can these serve as a potential positive source for those that 
argue in favour of hybridity, and ultimately protect the welfare of citizens, 
especially women?   
 
Research was conducted in short research trips over 2015-2016 in all four geographic 
regions in Sierra Leone, specifically Freetown (Western Area), Bo (south), Kambia 
and Makeni (north), and Kenema (east). Methods included semi-structured individual 
and group interviews (questions were tailored to the different interview 
participants) with police; lawyers; local and international civil society activists, 
including women’s rights actors; key elites within the relevant line ministries of 
Justice and Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children’s Affairs; leaders and 
members of secret societies; women and men non-members of secret societies; 
businesswomen and men; teachers; nurses; Family Support Unit representatives of 
the Sierra Leone Police (SLP), chiefs, and Muslim and Christian religious leaders. 
Data was also obtained through meetings on women’s rights, justice and policing 
issues. 
 
SSR in Sierra Leone has focused heavily on the state justice sector in response to 
identified weaknesses therein. However, reforms have been criticised for being 
elitist, perceivably foreign and hence lacking community ownership, state-centric, 
and non-responsive to women’s security, particularly in peacetime. The government 
has made efforts in this regard to address, for example, female underrepresentation 
within the police through the review and revision of police policies on sexual 
exploitation, abuse and harassment in 2014. Yet women continue to face challenges 
in accessing justice across the security and justice sectors. Police family support 
units set up to handle SGBV among other matters are under-resourced and far 
outnumbered by the numbers of women who need their services. Women are made 
to pay for health care that is supposed to be free, and survivors of sexual assault 
can only get support at any of three Rainbo Centres in Freetown, Kono, and Kenema. 
Shortages of courts and other institutional obstacles pose further challenges. 
 
Chiefs are primary and respected reference points, despite numerous documented 
abuses by them. Other non-state actors cited by respondents include family 
members and/or elders and civil society organisations. Some respondents mentioned 
secret societies but often as an afterthought or in response to probing. Known as 
Bondo in the North and in Freetown and Sande in the South, they are instrumental 
in teaching girls how to be good wives and mothers, of which the rite of passage of 
female genital cutting is central, thus conforming to traditional culturally prescribed 
gender norms. Secret societies also are widely revered and feared for their putative 
power to punish, both spiritually and physically, men who mistreat their wives or 
anyone who violates Bondo/Sande laws. Prominent politicians often have to belong 
to a society before they can be elected, and Bondo/Sande are seen as repositories 
for economic self-help. Some state rulings, like the continuing ban on FGM imposed 
during the Ebola crisis, have affected Bondo/Sande practices. But, unlike chiefs, 
there are few laws with direct implications on the practices of secret societies and 
they remain largely outside the domain of the state.  
 
To what extent can the power of secret societies benefit women? Which women 
benefit? In practice, secret societies illustrate that institutional female 
representation is not a sufficient condition for transformation, and that cultural 
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contexts must also be taken into account. As customary institutions, Bondo/Sande 
serve as custodians of customs and traditions that ultimately privilege men and 
maintain the status quo. Internal relationships among women within the societies 
are hierarchical and characterised by power differentials, access to their power is 
restricted to members, and they can serve as sources of insecurity to non-members. 
In one example, in 2008, Manjia Balema Samba, a female journalist reporting for UN 
Radio, was stripped naked, beaten and paraded around town in Kenema District by 
Bondo Society members, following an interview that highlighted health and other 
concerns with FGM (despite police intervention, no arrests were ultimately made).  
 
While the literature projects a very active secret society presence in security and 
justice, interviews reveal a more nuanced reality. First, in practice, it would appear 
that their role is limited by several factors, including laws mandating the referral of 
grievous cases to the state justice and security system, the costs of navigating that 
system, and families’ unwillingness to see cases through to their rational end. 
Further, they seem to be more actively involved with smaller domestic disputes, 
especially child related ones, like underage pregnancy (where sex is consensual), 
disputes between mothers and children, and encouraging girl child education.  
 
Overall, this research shows that formal and traditional sources of justice and 
security can reinforce each other. Socio-cultural factors that hinder justice in the 
formal sector are also present in the informal sector, with the consequence that 
women ultimately suffer in both. While secret societies can and do challenge male 
figures, and have been able to secure justice for women, including for example, 
ensuring that women have access to land, most rulings, including domestic abuse 
cases are guided by a cultural framework that continues to privilege men and 
advocates a circumscribed understanding of the role of women. In the same way 
that these power relations must be questioned in order for women to enjoy justice 
in the formal sector, the same must be done in the informal sector.  
COMMENTS BY DISCUSSANT,  KATHRYN NWAJIAKU,  OECD,  FRANCE 
 
Kathryn commended what she termed an approach to “security in the vernacular” 
of centring research on people on the receiving end of hybrid security in Sierra Leone 
and made a few further observations: 
 
• Is it justifiable to use a secret society, especially one engaged in [female 
genital] cutting, as a prism to interrogate traditional structures? Are we 
wishing them into something they are not in order to make policy options 
more feasible? 
• The paper could feature with greater clarity the perspectives of those on 
the receiving end, i.e. women, of secret societies’ security interventions. 
• Consider looking at Sierra Leone as an evolving space with many non-state 
actors, not just secret societies, and ask what’s transpiring in those spaces 
that research needs to be more astute about? 
• The theoretical link between security and justice, e.g. body violence as a 
major threat to women, could be stronger.  
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Title: Gender, Transitional Justice and Justice Sector Reform in Liberia 
Researcher/Author: Freida M’Cormack, Institute for Development Studies, 
Sussex University, UK 
 
Two key questions guided this research:  
• In a context where the formal security and justice systems are under-
resourced and under-capacitated, what are the prospects for 
complementary rather than competitive dispute resolution systems that 
provide justice, particularly for women in rural areas who continue to be 
under-served by both customary and statutory systems?  
• How are ongoing processes such as exploration of alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms influencing women’s access to justice? 
 
Access to justice for sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) is a critical entry point 
into research on hybrid security for several reasons. A complex set of cultural, 
community, structural, and societal factors intersect in ways that produce narratives 
of masculinity anchored on male entitlement and aggression and dominance that are 
yielding high levels of SGBV in the country (an estimated 25 per cent of the prison 
population is for SGBV crimes). This matrix, combined with the limited reach of the 
formal justice and security system, is a significant hindrance to justice for affected 
women and girls—only four per cent of criminal cases and three per cent of civil 
cases make it to the formal courts.  
 
The Ebola outbreak delayed research but afforded an extended literature review. 
Other methods consisted of process mapping, including of the progress of various 
draft legislations and mechanisms to develop ADR mechanisms; 168 structured and 
unstructured interviews in xxx counties with police, judiciary, government officials; 
traditional authorities, civil society groups, etc.; focus group discussions with male 
and female elders, traditional authorities  and county ministry staff, and participant 
observation of the 2015-2020 UN Joint Programme on SGBV and security and 
community meetings. 
 
Liberia operates a hybrid security system with four layers: a formal justice system, 
modelled on that of the US; a customary legal system mostly worked through Chiefs 
(or customary) courts, ‘created by regulation and statute’; a ‘traditional’ indigenous 
system, and an informal system of civil society, national, and international actors. 
A mapping of relations among these actors shows, among other things, seeming 
overlaps in, and confusion over, the relative roles and responsibilities of formal and 
informal sectors, without clear delineation or sufficient information about the 
limitations of each. Also, there are ample opportunities in both systems to 
compromise cases, resulting from women’s perceived inferior position in society and 
exacerbated by the perpetration of crimes by senior or prominent members in 
society. Further, while most respondents were aware of the formal system’s 
jurisdiction over rape and threat-to-life issues, this was not universal and other 
issues, such as domestic violence (and other domestic disputes, which communities 
linked to SGBV), were not considered relevant to the formal sector.  
 
Analyses of formal and informal actors revealed inherent strengths and weaknesses 
as illustrated in the table below: 
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System Strengths/Advances Weaknesses 
FORMAL 
• Existing (robust) 
legislation 
• Justice sector 
reform 
• Police reform 
• Policy development 
and implementation 
• Inadequate implementation 
of frameworks/reforms 
• Structural constraints 
• Corruption and impunity 





• More ‘fair’, less 
costly and more 
accessible – ‘user-
friendly’ 
• Dispute resolution 
based on widely 
accepted cultural 





social relations.  
• State’s co-option and 
corruption of informal 
justice processes 
• lack of resources --> greater 
susceptibility to bribery 
• Formal restrictions eroding 
authority of traditional 
systems 
• traditional structures and 
practices are perceived as 
enabling SGBV, e.g. genital 
mutilation/cutting (FGM/C)  
OTHER INFORMAL ACTORS 
• UN-Government of 
Liberia Joint 
Programme for SGBV 
• Peace huts 








Recommendations will need to target individual sectors as well as the nexuses and 
relationships between different sectors. Within individual sectors, it is imperative 
to increase physical access and reduce structural barriers to the formal system, as 
well as address a lack of coordination and cooperation among formal government 
structures, particularly within the executive (ministries of justice, internal affairs, 
health, etc.). In the traditional sector, there is a need to raise greater awareness 
among traditional authorities of the legal system and their limitations within it. A 
further priority is the need to change social norms through whole-of-community 
efforts that engage women, men, boys and girls, and traditional authorities. 
Regarding relations among different sectors, it would be helpful to increase 
collaborations and dialogue between law enforcement officials and traditional 
authorities through purposeful interactions; train traditional women leaders in the 
referral pathway; engage civil society and foster national ownership of these 





COMMENTS BY DISCUSSANT,  THOMAS JAYE,  KOFI ANNAN 
INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING TRAINING CENTRE,  GHANA 
 
• The cultural diversity of even a single small state like Liberia must be 
acknowledged as cultural practices vary across the country. 
• Though there is broad consensus that murder and rape are the state’s 
prerogative, there are varying perceptions of what constitutes serious 
violence and who should handle it. 
• Chiefs’ own legitimacy is in question owing to changes in their selection 
process (they are now elected, unlike previously) and in the quality of 
candidates such that they are no longer taken seriously or respected and often 
lack the critical historical knowledge that undergirds the institution.  
• On the question of alternative dispute resolution, how alternative is 
alternative? What is it alternative to? How can this be framed differently 
taking cognisance of practices that are organic to beneficiaries? Whose 
[development and peacebuilding] agenda is being advanced with the use of 
such terms? 
• The approach of NGOs and other actors trying to ‘do’ human rights is 
inherently problematic and accounts for the persistence of social problems 
that they have been trying to solve for many years. 
• Secret societies, as their name suggests, have long been and will remain 
inaccessible. They are also closely embedded in other entities, including 
formal/public sector and institutions. 
GENERAL DISCUSSIONS  
• It would be helpful for researchers to offer some elucidation on their personal 
link(s) with their chosen subject(s). Subjectivity is important as not all 
concepts/constructs travel well across other contexts. (NB: this participant 
had never heard of a secret society and had trouble engaging the idea.) 
• How can norms change? Which new norms should we establish? And what 
strategies can be used to measure social change(s)?  
• The entire project may have been remiss in not looking at language and the 
implications of popular frames of accepted concepts like ‘alternative’ dispute 
resolution. 
• The paper is rich but would benefit from a slight restructuring that asks and 
shows how useful secret societies are to the state and NGOs as well as to 
women. The power associated with secret societies also needs to be 
illustrated beyond anecdotes. For example, are they able to mitigate levels 
of say husband violence, given the dominance of traditional marriage 
cultures/norms within their main operative contexts? Do they have any say in 
regulating women’s access to land?  
• Though it is important to obtain empirical knowledge on the broad non-state 
security matrix in Sierra Leone, there is merit in focusing on a traditional 
women’s organisation, particularly one that presents interesting dilemmas 
regarding the protection of women’s rights by women’s institutions and the 
potential difficulties of one that has historically performed genital cutting 
becoming an advocate for justice and security in cases of violence. It might 
be useful to historicise the secret society by observing how it has evolved 
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since its inception as traditional institutions are no less dynamic than formal 
ones. 
• How holistic is the germaneness of hybridity to our make-up as Africans? 
What’s the exact status of hybridity: is one way of life more dominant? Are 
both [formal and informal] parallel?  
• A brief exchange between Freida and one participant uncovered the practice 
of rape in Liberia as an accepted preface to marriage in some contexts, raising 
the questions of harmful traditional practices that uphold violent 
constructions of masculinity, and the dilemma around the prospect of 
‘converting’ into champions of justice and security the same systems that 
enable such violence. It was suggested that some social problems like child 
rape, which is endemic in Liberia, should be addressed not as resolvable 
problems but confronted with radical, aggressive approaches that can 
overturn harmful norms and end them abruptly. 
 
 
Session III: Securing Pride: Sexuality, Security, and the Post-Apartheid 
State  
Xavier Livermon, University of Texas in Austin, US 
 
In line with other studies on safety and security in South Africa, this paper was 
contextualised within a long history of insecurity caused by Apartheid and framed 
as a discussion of whose security needs the post-Apartheid state is serving. The term 
security is often used to suppress those at the margins of gender and sexual 
propriety. Against this background, in the global South, the humanitarian rescue 
doctrine is explored as a particular form of governmentality in contexts where 
examples abound throughout Africa of LGBT subjects as sites of moral panic. It is in 
this light that governments like South Africa’s claim to protect LGBT populations 
against popular depictions of them as assaults on public morality. Yet the hybrid 
nature of security and governance creates split citizenship rights for black LGBT 
South Africans: their legally guaranteed state citizenship is queried by the cultural 
argument that homosexuality is ‘un-African’.  
 
Gender and sexuality emerged as key components of security within the framework 
of human security following critiques that the latter did not address questions of 
gender sufficiently. Subsequent critiques that Hudson’s work reified and naturalised 
dominant/cis gender categories led to calls to denaturalise gender categories and 
gender binaries such that meanings traditionally associated with gender expanded 
to include social constructions of not just women but also men and LGBT persons. 
Though states are mobilised in explicitly heteropatriarchal and heteronormative 
terms, interrogating the security of LGBT subjects requires a radical rethinking of 
the state away from these terms. 
Based on the framework by Jarvis and Lister (2013) that lists six aspects of 
vernacular security, physical survival (belonging, hospitality, equality, liberty, and 
the disputably negative curtailment of liberties to ensure safety), Soweto Pride, an 
annual LGBT event, is presented as a form of vernacular security that lays claim to 
a specific racialised and sexualised space and contributes to reframing everyday 
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forms of violence and invisibility. In 2016, the organisers of Soweto Pride were 
compelled to cancel the event in capitulation to imposed state conditions that were 
impossible to meet, like the demand that FEW charge an entrance fee as a means 
of crowd control and obtain a liquor license and sell alcohol at the venue, both of 
which the organisation pointed out is against its ethos of accessibility.  The South 
African police service also raised the Soweto Pride risk category from low to medium 
without explanation, requiring the organisers to hire more police and security detail 
at costs prohibitive to them. Collectively, these actions amounted to state coercion 
to prevent Soweto Pride, raising questions about the extent to which LGBT spaces 
are subject(ed) to state management and control. 
 
Jo’burg Pride contrasts with Soweto Pride as one of multiple white elite spaces that 
are often exclusionary. It appears to be more pliant to state demands, raising 
questions around which LGBT bodies the state finds more acceptable. Informal 
norms often govern questions of gender and sexual propriety and do become 
instituted in law by way of, for example, criminalising sex work and LGBT, and 
disparate ages of consent for male and female. However, in this form such norms 
are often unevenly enforced by state and non-state actors, including traditional and 
religious leaders, police/courts, and private security. 
 
Some recommendations toward achieving an effective inclusive sexuality justice and 
security sector in South Africa include rethinking the limits of state recognition of 
the most vulnerable gender and sexuality non-conforming Africans as it may privilege 
or legitimise a particular kind of LGBT subjectivity while suppressing others. Another 
consideration should be the decarceration of the state through the adoption of non-
carceral frameworks for punishment and restitution like restorative justice to 
address violence against LGBT persons. The implication for related research beyond 
South Africa is that scholars and advocates must rethink the assumptions that we 
make about which kinds of bodies are implicated in SSR in Africa; LGBT bodies 
possess an extra layer of vulnerability in addition to other intersectional 
vulnerabilities. 
 
COMMENTS BY DISCUSSANTS 
KATHRYN NWAJIAKU 
• The paper is rich, written in vivid readable style, and discusses issues like 
belonging and invisibility that resonate across other contexts, even beyond 
Africa. It portrays how narratives differ from and contrast starkly with reality. 
• Among the multiple issues that it foregrounds, the author might consider 
focusing on specific ideas. The link between carcerality and capital, for 
example, is left hanging, with no conclusive answer to the ‘what then?’ 
question in this discussion. 
• By way of a recommendation, consider being more radical in addressing the 
dilemmas of identity regarding differing conceptions of citizenship before the 
law and culture. 





• Following general observations about the surprising homophobia in South 
Africa given its political history and contemporary societal openness and 
embrace of human rights, Eboe suggested that the role of popular culture in 
questioning homosexuality had perhaps gotten lost during writing and needs 
to be re-added as the paper progresses. 
GENERAL DISCUSSIONS  
• Does more security necessarily equal more safety? Which should take priority? 
• There was a brief discussion and agreement to discuss dissemination of this 
paper which has foregrounded different concerns, including artist and black 
lesbians as it has evolved, each of which is important and critical to further 
research. 
 
Session IV: Security in Côte d’Ivoire 
Title: Formal organisation and decision-making processes of Ivorian defence 
and security forces.     
Researcher/Author: Moussa Fofana, University of Bouake, Cote d’Ivoire 
This study set out to interrogate the presence of unofficial recruits in the high 
echelons of the Ivoirian army and to explore the links between their trajectories and 
the problems of restructuring facing that institution today. That current recruitment 
modalities into Côte d’Ivoire’s national defence force are unknown to former 
dissident fighters and regular soldiers alike is testament to the querulous state of 
things in the country’s security sector. Efforts to integrate leaders of former 
belligerent groups into the army and pay off ex-soldiers are part of a larger project 
to restructure the defence and security sector after a decade of military and 
political crisis triggered by electoral tensions. But recurrent mutinies signal the 
ineffectiveness of these efforts in which the army has gradually become a major 
stakeholder in the process of embrittlement of the state. Further, these efforts 
create the impression that the army continues to be an instrument of the 
consolidation of power for the benefit of former regimes. 
 
The army is underequipped—a legacy of the 1980s economic crisis and political 
transformations in the 1990s. It also remains divided, having been enmeshed in 
rivalries between past political leaders throughout the 2000s.In this time, the army 
lost control over its personnel and their training, and could no longer be said to 
represent a republican army. Successive changes of the name of the army during 
this period betray its weakness. 
 
With scant empirical work on the Ivoirian army and a predominance of speculative 
anecdotal evidence, data was collected using informal interviews with former 
servicepersons and officers under conditions of anonymity. Other sources were the 
local media and the outcomes of interviews conducted during the researchers’ 
doctoral fieldwork. Given the sensitive nature of the subject, the study did not 
obtain formal authorisation from state authorities. 
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The informalisation of the army has unfolded over three decades owing to prevailing 
sociopolitical contexts and specific logics that informed the absorption into the army 
of 4000 young patriots in 2002,7000 former rebels in 2007, and 2600 more in 
2011.This occurred alongside disruptions caused by incidents like the republican 
guard’s refusal to demobilise in 1996, and the reinstatement of demobilised soldiers 
by Robert Guéï in 2000. 
 
A mapping was produced of the informal trajectories of inclusion of recruits in the 
national army between 1990 and 2011 which shows that its constitution, this internal 
hybridisation, and the relations among its different parties are merely a reflection 
of the messy politics affecting the rest of the country. Political and ethnic identity 
continue to influence ongoings in the army, careers remain politically determined, 
and there is a palpable feeling that the institution, far from being united, is really 
two armies in one. The informalisation of the army masks the stringent efforts being 
made to modernise and train Côte d’Ivoire’s defense forces. 
 
Clearly, the problems facing the Ivoirian army are unresolved, though pressing. As a 
matter of urgency, the army needs to be equipped with the means and skills to make 
it less dependent on the political sphere. More emphasis should be placed during 
training on the ethic of commitment within a republican army, and all members 
should have equal merit-based access to promotion. Civil-military relations need to 
be redefined on the basis of a real republican pact. 
 
Title: The Dozo Brotherhood in Côte d’Ivoire: Socio-cultural and Security 
Implications 
Researcher/Author: Fahiraman Rodrigue Koné  
Despite a questionable human rights record and consequent attempts to excise them 
from Côte d’Ivoire’s security sector by the state and the United Nations, dozos 
continue to deliver security, particularly in local communities, and sometimes in 
association with state security operations. This study set out to answer three main 
research questions: 
 
• Who are dozos?  
• How did these ‘traditional community hunters’ come to play a role in the 
national security system?  
• What are their links with the formal state security system?  
 
Data sources consisted of secondary data obtained from documentary evidence and 
literature, and primary data from individual and group interviews with dozo leaders 
and ordinary members, ethnic group community members, soldiers and others. It 
took place in Abidjan (south), Bouaké (centre), Korogho (north), and Daloa and 
Duekoué (west). 
To make meaning of the dozo, they must be situated within the particular historical 
and political experience of the Mandingo cultural universe that cuts across and 
united multiple populations in West Africa (Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone). The dozo worldview originates from a system of beliefs, a moral and 
ethical code that defines it and orders its relation with the external world. The 
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functioning and internal organisation of dozo associations are based on the principles 
of universality and equality on the one hand, fraternity, solidarity and loyalty on the 
other, and submission to the authority of the teachers (masters/elders). The dozo 
are organised into chapters that all belong to a national federation though the latter 
is undergoing leadership conflicts arising from differences over the benefits of their 
prominence and marketisation.  
 
Dozo became involved in the security market in the early 1990s due to the failure of 
the Ivorian State to provide adequate security to all citizens, in a context of 
pauperisation and expansion of crimes in urban and rural areas. Since then, they 
have been invited to various regions of the country to assist national security forces 
to secure the country’s populations and their successes have been publicised by the 
media. The demand for their services has escalated in tandem with the strong 
demand for private security by economic actors and individuals. It is fed, on one 
hand, by beliefs in their supposed magic powers and on the other hand, by the 
ethical and moral values of honesty, courage, and a sense of duty with which they 
are credited. A second factor in the popularisation of dozo is the violent crisis of 
Ivorian democracy in the mid-1990s that led to their instrumentalisation within the 
ethno-political struggle waged by political actors. 
 
in some parts of the country, notably the forest areas (west and south), the political 
commitment of the dozo has eroded their positive image with local populations 
perceiving them as a militia for the government in power. They have been 
questioned in the abuses against the people of these regions who were close to the 
former regime, especially during the 2011 post-electoral violence, and during 
numerous land conflicts between these populations and migrants from the north of 
the country.  
 
Dozos, like former fighters, have been recruited into the national army where some 
of them, like dozo leader Koné Zakaria, hold high positions. On the ground, although 
the authorities deny direct collaboration with the Dozo at the central level, there 
are many examples of cooperation between dozos and the police and gendarmerie 
at the community level. 
 
In light of the failure of efforts to restrain dozo security activity, the state cannot 
continue to ignore the influences of these so-called informal actors on the national 
security system. Continuing and successful collaborations in communities with local 
dozo associations by local state actors could prevent the risks of potential human 
rights abuses by dozo. The state must work toward a more effective community 
security policy by initiating dialogue on the modalities of this collaboration, 
especially in areas where there is not enough state security coverage. 
 
COMMENTS BY DISCUSSANTS 
MPAKO FOALENG,  UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR WEST AFRICA  AND  THE  
SAHEL  (UNOWAS)    
• The papers are very timely given that the UN operation in Côte d’Ivoire 
concluded its mandate on 30 June and the country file has moved from the 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations to her office, the UN Office in West 
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Africa, with a focus on sustaining peace and maintaining benefits of peace 
process.  
• There is a clear challenge and unanswered question regarding how to 
reconcile different groups under a single hierarchy in ways that ensure loyalty 
to the state and legitimately elected authorities.  
• The paper tries to explain the concept of hybridity but there seems to be a 
tension between the researcher’s understanding and the reality? On the 
ground. Are they two sides of one coin? The paper does not explain this 
relationship enough.  
• How are you situating informality/hybridity/formality? 
• Questions were posed but not answered about what the formal recruitment 
process is now and its status in relation to informal processes. 
• The papers should be clearer and more forthcoming about key lessons and 
policy implications.  
• The dozo paper is brilliant but the dozo role in communities is unclear. 
Beyond the intermittent discussion of human rights, there needs to be a 
stronger link with dozo accountability/norms systems. What sanctions exist 
where these are contravened? 
MAXIME RICARD,  UNIVERSITY OF MONTREAL  
• This paper is valuable because it studies security actors for what they are vs. 
what they should be. It defeats the idea that order comes from a [state] 
monopoly of violence and historicises the army well. 
• The author should strengthen his theoretical basis/es by looking at work on 
the critical anthropology of rebellion (Marielle de bos, Paul Richards, etc.). 
Try to understand the rationalities of the actors that disrupted the Ivorian 
army during the various mutinies.  
• The dozo paper is a commendable update of 1990s research that shows how 
the institution has evolved over the last 20 years and sets out clearly the 
import of the country’s contemporary army in its current state. 
GENERAL COMMENTS AND DISCUSSIONS  
Questions, some intended for later reflection, included: 
• What insights exist into the practices of informal groups when they are 
absorbed into the army? 
• With reference to the points in Jimam’s paper on the pluralisation of law vs. 
the pluralisation of policy and practice, is Côte d’Ivoire heading toward 
hybridisation as law or will hybridity remain an on-the-ground reality? 
• Who should and who has the interest to provide the means to depoliticise the 
army? What are the implications of the findings in terms of statebuilding and 
nation building in Côte d’Ivoire? What does/would it take to have an ‘armée 
nation’?  
• Dozo sanctions lie partly in transgenerational beliefs in the negative spiritual 
repercussions of bad behaviour/violation of dozo norms.  
• The political economy of dozo presence in Abidjan is feeding the market for 
mystic powers that are being sought by children (known as microbes) and 
increasing their criminality. 
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• How does (in)formalisation play out from a community perspective? 
• Are our methods perhaps just not adequate for attaining certain information? 
• The researchers were referred to recent work by Scott Strauss on the making 
and unmaking of nations and his thesis that strong nationalistic army values 
are the reason why there has been no genocide in that country despite the 
abundance of conducive conditions. 
 
Session V: Somaliland and Sierra Leone (Civilian Defence Forces) 
Chair: Medhane Tadesse 
Title: Hybrid Security Governance in Somaliland 
Researcher/Author: Mohamed Abdi Omer, Academy for Peace and Development, 
Somaliland 
 
After giving an overview of key historical events in Somaliland, notably the 1981 
formation of armed resistance movements and onset of civil conflict, and the 1990 
Collapse of Somalia’s central government, Mohamed stated the research questions 
as follows: 
 
• What are the networks and processes that span the divide between 
formality and informality security governance in Somaliland? 
• What are the roles of informal security institutions and what are the 
interactions and interface between them and the formal security 
institutions in Somaliland? 
• How does hybridity impact on the security and entitlements of citizens, 
particularly in situations of vulnerability, exclusion an equity? 
 
Methods were chiefly qualitative and consisted of focus group discussions, 
unstructured interviews, and key informant interviews. Research involved a limited 
quantitative survey of hybrid security governance in two locations: Hargeisa town 
(urban) and Dilla District (rural). Respondents in both settings included formal 
institutions — the district administration, the district police commission, local 
government authorities, the national police force, and the judiciary, and informal 
institutions: traditional elders, religious leaders, ad hoc religious courts, youth 
vigilante groups, neighborhood committees, and the committee for the promotion 
of virtue and prevention of vice. 
 
The research findings indicate that Somaliland hybrid security order comprises 
informal and state security governance actors. In its current state, informality is 
deeply embedded in formal security and justice provision and informal institutions 
use their legitimacy to underpin the provision of security in the country. In the urban 
areas, informal institutions complement the formal in the provision of hybrid 
security and justice. In the rural areas, justice and security provision is the collective 
responsibility of formal and informal institutions. The public is the first to benefit 
from the hybrid security order for the fact that informal institutions augment the 
capacities of formal institutions with no or minimum cost. Because of the 
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inefficiency associated with the formal courts, many people resort to Sharia courts, 
creating a space where the latter competes with the formal justice institutions.  
 
Informal institutions also benefit from the hybrid security order, given the fact that 
it boosts their legitimacy among the public. Minorities and women are losers in 
hybrid security governance because of its leniency to unequal power relationships 
and male-dominated culture. The reinforcement of working relationships within the 
security governance actors requires support from each system through tolerance, 
dependence, trust and reconciliation.  
 
Recommendations include that community members should be involved and take 
ownership of their own security within their communities. The fragility of the hybrid 
security order should be carefully analyzed and its lack of sustainability should not 
be overlooked. Non-state security actors should be appreciated and legalised to 
perform in a well structured mechanism in recognition that state actors alone are 
not adequate in terms of security provision. 
 
Title: Civil Defence Forces and Chiefdom Security Committees in Sierra Leone.  
Researcher/Author: Osman Gbla, Centre for Development and Security Analysis 
(CEDSA), Sierra Leone 
This presentation expounded the diverse networks and processes involved in formal 
and informal security, policing and justice provisioning in Sierra Leone using the 
Civil Defence Forces (CDFs), the Chiefs customary justice system and Ebola as case 
studies.   
 
The research critically examines the manifestation of hybrid security governance in 
practice, its major constraints and its sustainability in post-conflict Sierra Leone.   
Specifically, it identifies and analyzes the diverse networks and processes of the 
formal and informal security, policing and justice institutions in order to generate 
an understanding of their interwoven nature.   
 
The major research questions that the study addresses are: In what ways are the 
informal security, justice and governance structures embedded in the formal 
structures of Sierra Leone?  What various roles do informal structures play in the 
security, justice and governance of Sierra Leone and do they work in cooperation or 
in conflict with the formal structures? What are the impacts of the interwoven roles 
of formal and informal structures on the entitlements and livelihoods of the citizens? 
How can accountable, effective and transparent hybridized roles be developed? 
 
Some of the important findings of the paper are that: although hybrid security 
governance has over the years been dictated by varying historical contexts in Sierra 
Leone, its manifestations and relevance are clearly visible in the country’s present-
day realities; Sierra Leone’s  customary justice administered by chiefs is not static 
as one would want to imagine as it is evolving and responding to changing contexts; 
various efforts have over the years been made to build viable, transparent and 
efficient hybrid security governance but its operation in practice is fraught with a 
number of challenges.  
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COMMENTS BY DISCUSSANTS 
SOMALILAND -  DAOUD ALWAN ( IGAD)   
 
As a reviewer of the report, my expectations were frustrated as neither the findings, 
nor the body of the text respond to the research questions brilliantly listed by the 
researcher as follows: 
 
• Identifying networks and processes of formality and informality in urban 
setting like Hargeisa and in rural locality such as Dilla. 
• Identifying the roles of informal security institutions and their interactions 
or interface with formal ones in the designated sites of the study. 
• Finding out the sources of financing of these informal security institutions. 
• Determining the way this hybrid security governance in Somaliland could be 
used as a source of inspiration elsewhere in Africa. 
 
Though rich in detail on the political process that produced Somaliland, the narrative 
seems to focus more on the first stages of peacebuilding and state-consolidation in 
Somaliland and to the exclusion of the last and recent decade of political processes 
and dynamics. Clear lacuna are evident particularly in highlighting the current 
groups and factions and their rivalries and cooperation around some of the more 
intractable issues like the future of Somaliland polity within a radically transforming 
geopolitical environment marked by the frustration of the youth, the emergence of 
new lines of thinking concerning the roles of Islam in daily politics, the threat of 
terrorists operating cross-border with the rest of Somalia and their affiliated groups, 
the absence of clear prospects in solving the international legal stalemate with the 
parent state of Somalia which is still considered as the sole internationally 
recognised entity. 
 
In the literature sources, pride of place seems to be given to the opinions and 
positions held by controversial colonial anthropologists like Ian Lewis, an author 
much acquainted with northern Somali clan politics who worked within the British 
colonial administration during the protectorate period in Somaliland. It is simplistic 
and misleading to characterising the political contest between the various political 
actors within the unitary state of Somalia from its inception in the 1960s up to its 
destruction in 1991 as a process exclusively monopolised by the competitions and 
hostilities between two Somali clans, namely the Darood and the Issaq. Without 
totally dismissing the importance of clan differentiation in Somalis politics, caution 
should be taken in light of the work of analyst and historian Sam Mealy who 
relevantly characterises the deficiencies of the Somali Polity during the emergence 
of the first Republican state in the following terms: ‘Independent Somalia during the 
1960’s provides an historical illustration of Huntington’s ‘political gap’ hypothesis: 
rapid social change and the consequent mobilisation of new groups into politics often 
outpaces the development of political institutions able to process their participation 
and demands. When political participation suddenly expands without corresponding 






Some suggestions for improvement: 
 
• Add more background information for readers not acquainted with Horn of 
Africa and Somali politics. This should include some graphs showing the 
genealogical representations of various clans and sub-clans and also a map 
of the ‘geopolitical’ and clan territorial distribution of Somaliland. 
• Shorten the report and make it more concise by concentrating on the last 
decade and, in particular, the dynamics of the house of elders with the 
various formal and informal sections of Somaliland politics and its broader 
polity. 
• Hargeisa is a settlement of people from all over the country and should not 
considered a representation of the country’s true culture. 
• Not enough is known about the real functioning of the Guurti. The paper 
would be ground breaking if it dedicated some analysis to this very 
important issue. 
 
Further caution is required regarding the applicability of the concept of hybridity 
to the peculiarity that is Somaliland. Per the notion of the quasi-state advanced by 
scholars like Pal Kolsto (2006), there is debate among analysts about whether 
Somaliland possesses the full characteristics of a state, especially given its 
continued non-recognition by most members of the international system. The 




The paper has improved considerably since the last workshop and is now a fitting 
update of I M Lewis’ work on Somaliland in the 1960s.Final suggestions for revision 
more work on the relationship of sub-clan structures with habitation patterns in 
urban spaces, the need to reconcile with one voice and flow what was written by 
different people, and the impact of the social insurance that social groups when 
their members commit social vices. 
SIERRA LEONE -  ERNEST ANSAH LARTEY (KAIPTC) 
The paper firmly establishes three key facts about hybrid security formations in 
Sierra Leone: 
 
First, the security sector in the country is split between the formal and informal 
sectors, with the formal sector (i.e. military, police, intelligence, immigration etc.) 
operating as the mainstream rule of law bearers of security, whilst the informal 
sector (such as the Civil Defence Forces (CDFs), chiefs, customary justice system 
etc.) operate as the alternative security mechanism.  
 
Second, with evidence from previous survey reports, the paper establishes that 
majority of the Sierra Leonean population prefer the informal security system to the 
formal security system. Therefore, in terms of preference and acceptance, this 
finding portrays a shift in the status quo wherein the informal security sector now 
occupies the mainstream sector, thus pushing the formal security sector to the 
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alternative. However, in spite of this fact, the narrative still maintains the old order 
that reinforces the status quo.  
 
Third, in spite of the binary categorisation of the formal and informal security 
sectors, overlaps exist between the two categories.  This is presented differently in 
the form of the CHISECs, DISECs and PROSECs. More so, the creation of bodies such 
as the Police Partnership Board (PPB), Area Police Partnership Committees and the 
Zonal Security Committees suggest a firm interface between the formal and informal 
security sectors. This interface produces a continuum- rather than a binary- of the 
security sector where authority, legitimacy, capacity, accountability and control are 
shared (in some different degree) between the formal and informal sectors. 
 
The paper could consider the following questions: 
 
1. Are the alternative security mechanisms the new normal in security sector 
transformation? 
2. Is hybrid security concept an operational, policy or coordination tool for 
managing a security sector which is fragmented? How does it deal with issues 
of duplication of efforts and of turf battles amongst the various actors?   
3. It seems that when we talk of hybridity, it is more expressed (or applicable) 
at the local level (i.e. micro-level security concept) than at the national level 
(macro-level security concept). This is because the inclusion of the chiefs in 
the security sector does not transcend to the national security level. What 
accounts for this? 
 
4. Do we not risk politicising the chieftaincy institution by including it in security 
structures such as the DISECs and CHISECs which have top politicians 
represented? And apart from the chiefs, are there no other CSOs represented 
on the CHISECs?  
5. Who is a chief, how does one become a chief and how do chiefs sustain 
themselves in Sierra Leone? 
GENERAL DISCUSSIONS  
• Neither paper looks closely at public perceptions of security. 
• Prolonged inconclusive debate about the meaning of hybridity in Somaliland 
reflected a strong divergence of opinion between at least two participants 
on what the project has acknowledged is a contested subject.  
• Is Somaliland a hybrid political order or a new kind of state? Is the 
Somaliland model sustainable? What lessons does it hold for the rest of 
Africa? 
• There was also some disagreement on the role and influence of religious 
actors, especially in light of the growing prominence of Wahhabism in 
Somaliland and its significance for the rights of women and other sex and 
gender groups. Though female Somalilanders appear to have some 
autonomy, polygamy is rife and their identities remain rooted in their 




DAY  TWO 
Session VI: Nigeria 
Chair: Thomas Jaye 
Title: Hybridisation in the Organisation and Provision of Safety and Security in 
Poor Urban Nigeria 
Researcher/Author: Oluwole S. Ojewale (CLEEN) 
Nigeria’s state security actors have the core responsibility to provide security and 
to design and implement the country’s security policies for the protection of the 
state and its citizens. However, the complexity and upsurge of violent conflicts and 
criminality in the country and the consequences of poor security provisioning, have 
created security gaps that individuals and communities struggle to fill in diverse 
ways. Non-state (informal) policing systems have played vital roles in addressing the 
safety and security needs of most underprivileged populations. The poor patronise 
such informal actors for multiple reasons: their intimate knowledge of the society, 
their grassroots outlook, their ability to prevent criminal attacks in neighbourhoods, 
and their prompt response to security threats. Given that their existence and 
operations have not only added to the plurality of security actors but also 
compounded the ambiguity of roles and relationships, this study explores Nigeria’s 
widening hybrid security matrix against the hitherto exclusionary state posture. 
 
In this wise, the study asked the following questions: 
 
• Can patterns of embedding be identified between the State and non-state 
security organisations? 
• What are the likely impacts of the processes of hybridisation on the current 
security order in Nigeria?  
• How do these processes impact on vulnerable groups in society? What are 
the gender considerations in the processes of hybridisation of the current 
security order in Nigeria? 
 
The study focused on the nature of the relationships between state and non-state 
security actors with specific reference to the O’dua Peoples’ Congress (OPC), Bakassi 
Boys, Hisba (Muslim religious ‘police’), the Civilian Joint Task Force, the Nigeria 
Police Force and the military. A mixture of qualitative and quantitative research 
methods was employed to: 
 
• identify and analyse the diverse complexities of the formal and informal 
security sectors. 
• examine the similarities and differences between formal and informal 
security provisioning. 
• review the management and accountability processes. 
• deliberate on the perceived impact of the hybridisation of the formal and 
informal security systems on vulnerable citizens and communities. 
• assess the gender roles in formal and informal security structures while 
promoting a hybrid security system in Nigeria.  
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Historical antecedents, identity politics and nationalism, an overly centralized 
national policing institution, and a crisis of confidence in the police are among the 
conditions that gave rise to informal security provisioning. Informal security actors 
are found to be interwoven with the State through complex relationships of 
cooperation and competition. Hence, they simultaneously strengthen and weaken 
different dimensions of statehood. The proliferation of informal security actors is 
viewed through the prisms of opposition (Bakassi Boys and OPC); incorporation 
(Civilian JTF); codification (State level legislative backing); and competition (Hisba). 
Contrary to the belief that these informal actors lack proper organisational 
structures, coordination and legality, most of them actors are well organised with 
functional organogrammes. 
 
Informal mechanisms have become parallel strategies for protection for the majority 
of people excluded from mainstream security provisioning. Other findings include 
that formal-informal collaboration involves information sharing, training, and 
operational responsibilities, the result of which has somewhat improved intelligence 
gathering, leading to the effective identification of sect members and violent 
extremism. Also, traditional norms, values and practices continue to subordinate 
women and obstruct their progress in both private and public spheres, perpetuating 
unequal power relations. 
 
This study recommends that policymakers and practitioners, inter alia: 
 
▪ Recognise the role that informal systems play in security provisioning and, 
to that end, strengthen the links between formal and informal systems, 
including through community policing. 
▪ Incorporate eligible members of Civilian Joint Task Force and other security 
provisioning outfits into the formal security sector. 
▪  Prioritise women’s role in security provisioning in the country. 
▪ Address the legality of operations of informal actors. 
 
Title: Policing Actors, Plural Processes, and Hybridisation: Histories of Everyday 
Policing Practice in Central Nigeria.   
Researcher/Author: Jimam Lar 
This study is an extension of the author’s doctoral and other research on histories of 
plural policing in selected areas of Central Nigeria from the late colonial period to 
the present. Abroad framing of policing as all organised activity and services 
provided by statutory and non-statutory institutions that seek to ensure and 
maintain law, order and security, renders visible the pluralities of actors and 
practice in various contexts around the world where the state does not police alone. 
Also flowing from this conceptualisation is that policing is a mode of statecraft, a 
means of governing, situated within a plural landscape, that is shaped by political, 
economic and social interest and not simply a technical function of state confined 
to the lens of the criminologist. 
 
Beyond the quotidian forms of violence manifest in ethno-religious, identity-based 
conflicts that have preoccupied much analysis of violence, this research foregrounds 
violence as everyday policing practice. Literature that does study violence as 
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everyday policing explores with reluctance how such practices are embedded within 
policing practice in a field where state and non-state actors converge, interact and 
reproduce former, and sometimes new forms of policing practice. The paper further 
distinguishes subjective violence (disruptions to public order that we ‘identify and 
recognise as acts of crime, sectarian violence, and (physical violence)’by ‘a clearly 
identified subject’) and objective violence (that which is ‘inherent to the normal 
state of things’. Subjective violence is more visible because objective violence ‘is 
invisibly perpetrated so that the established order continues uninterrupted’. While 
aspects of these violences are embedded in the formation of the creation and 
existence of the colonial state, and consequent agitations for liberation, they also 
find meaning in the policing activity of non-state actors. Against this background, 
the paper seeks to answer three questions: 
 
• What are the historical and contemporary processes of socialising policing 
actors as it relates to violence and policing practice? 
• How does this socialisation manifest in everyday hybrid/plural policing 
practice of state and non-state policing actors? 
• What is the impact of this on citizens, particularly as it relates to structures 
of power and vulnerable groups? 
 
The study deployed a historical approach embedded in qualitative methods to 
specifically account for the origins and changing forms of policing. To examine the 
contemporary manifestations, selected ethnographic methods are used to 
complement the historical methods of data collection. Extensive fieldwork was done 
over several months in urban and rural central Nigeria and the researcher gathered 
archival material in Jos, Kaduna, and London. He also recorded personal histories 
and accounts of individuals and groups including serving and retired police officers, 
retired Native Authority Police (NAPF) officers, local government officials, 
community leaders, women leaders, vigilante group leaders and members, 
traditional rulers, youth leaders, and former British colonial officers. 
 
The paper examines processes of socialisation as an entry into understanding how 
policing actors learn and imbibe policing practice. It queries the influence on 
policing socialisation of cultures of ‘disciplinarity’ in the church and other spiritual 
entities and educational institutions (through corporal punishment). The 
socialisation of non-state police actors went from being superintended by 
community norms rooted in ancestral cult worship pre-colonialism, to state police 
during colonial rule, to ex-service personnel post-colonialism, and back to state 
police from the 1980s following security and other crises occasioned by the 
introduction of structural adjustment policies. ‘Vigilante policing’ was influenced by 
practices of the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) as well as by military tactics owing to the 
NPF’s absorption from 1976 to 78 of some 10,000 demobilised soldiers. Shared modes 
of operation include checkpoints and patrols which vigilante police do, in the day 
and at night, in groups of eight to ten, sometimes accompanied by an armed NPF 
officer(s). Vigilante police also wear uniforms (albeit un-uniform ones), carry arms, 
keep audio, visual, and written records, and hold post-activity debriefings at local 
chiefs’ houses. They also, like state police, arrest, detain and interrogate suspects 
using methods that include varying forms of corporal punishment, not unlike those 
practised in Nigerian public schools, and the ‘dance of shame’ that involves the 
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public shaming of suspected criminals in popular spaces like market squares on busy 
market days with slight disparities between rural and urban vigilantes.  
 
Beyond this socialisation, the relationship between state and vigilante police has 
two sides: direct and indirect vigilante cooperation with the police, and state police 
engagement in vigilante policing, police violence being considered, by some, a 
misnomer. Partly in a bid to regain social legitimacy, the state police, while 
perpetrating violence as part of policing practice, seems to also try to ensure that 
violence is controlled and as much as possible remains within the domain of policing. 
Seen from this angle, plurality is therefore operating within a dynamic that has 
structure and is organised. The study shows that policing practice transcends what 
obtains in legal frameworks and embraces equally the practices that individual 
actors engage with daily. Within a given social context, state-practice—policing 
practice—is conceived as a back-and-forth mediated negotiation. 
COMMENTS BY DISCUSSANTS,  OKEY UZOECHINA (ECOWAS)  & 
ALICE HILLS (DURHAM UNIVERSITY) 
 
Okey (ECOWAS) 
Nigeria presents an interesting case for the study of hybridity in the security sector. This is 
because the country has had enough historical antecedents, especially in the recent past 
where primary (formal) security sector and secondary (informal) security sector have 
interacted in adverse ways over, for example, the Bakasi, Niger Delta, and the Boko Haram 
crises. The paper is undoubtedly rich with many insightful examples of how the informal 
security sector in particular aids in the provision of safety and security in poor urban 
communities in Nigeria. However, the following key questions are worthy of note: 
• Given the very busy- otherwise crowded nature- of the security sector in Nigeria, 
does hybridity promote effectiveness and efficiency in the delivery of security and 
safety? 
• How do hybrid security formations promote opportunities for gender mainstreaming?  
• Noting the fact that decentralization has helped –in some limited ways-to restructure 
the security sector in Nigeria, does decentralization promote hybridity, especially at 
the state and local government levels as opposed to the federal level? 
Alice Hills 
The paper makes enjoyable reading and contains all the ingredients of a good research. 
Notably, it is commendable the way the author had managed to transform a PhD dissertation 
into a refine piece such as this article. As the author rightly notes, violence is an inherent 
element in policing practice. However, there are limits to the exercise of violence, 
particularly under rule of law and human rights governance.    
• The paper should be clear about the research objective. Similarly, rather than basing 
the research objectives on historical episodes, it will be helpful to have the 
objectives set on scientific sources.  
• The author can consider developing a roadmap of sequential arguments to enhance 
the internal logic of the paper. 
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• The section on “plurality, hybridity and violence” should tone down on the historical 
perspectives. 
 
GENERAL D ISCUSSIONS  
• How should the research reports get back to the research communities so that 
they don’t not only become subjects of information but also beneficiaries of 
research? 
• The political economy of vigilantism rests on three questions: Who wins? Who 
loses? and Who gets access to resources? Vigilantes are resourced mainly by 
the goodwill of communities and occasionally by dedicated state government 
budgets. Vigilantism is also about economic survival and livelihood. Often, 
groups patrol more prosperous areas so that they can receive more benefits.  
• Women have been mainstreamed into the CJTF to perform instrumental roles 
like searching for suicide bombers among Boko Haram women. To determine 
how they can be included more meaningfully beyond this requires further 
research of women’s diverse roles in the informal security sectors.  
• How does the CJTF operate? 
• How are vigilantes selected? Does anybody get excluded from the vigilante 
system? Is their recruitment driven solely by a volunteering ethic as pertains 
in jurisdictions like the US where volunteer fire servicepersons undergo 
thorough training and orientation that enhances their competence, credibility 
and public acceptance?  
• Are there different policing approaches, such as nationalised police forces 
that are regime focused, and localised police forces that ensure that 
communities control routine local-level violences? What are the trade-offs 
between these two policing options? 
• On the question of human rights abuses and the legitimacy of the CJTF: All 
policing approaches in Nigeria are influenced by past military experience. 
Vigilante practice is intended to enhance security for the poor, but they suffer 
the worst abuses.  
• There is the need to have a conversation around the Dozos, and the vigilante 
groups in the HSG Nigerian research papers. 
• Does the multiple role of policing impact on the studies? How do public, state, 















Session VII: Comparing Research Findings on Hybrid Security Governance          
Chair: Mpako Foaleng 
KAIPTC Research Team 
State security establishments like the police and the law courts are often presumed 
to be the main channels of response to community concerns, especially on security 
matters. The KAIPTC conducted research in Liberia to verify this claim, premised on 
the fact that traditional authorities have a crucial role to play in politics, even if 
this role is often poorly understood. It proceeded on the understanding that the role 
of chiefs transcends peace, security, and justice. 
 
In addition to broad communication and logistics constraints, research was 
hampered by the inaccessibility of some areas earmarked for fieldwork in Liberia, 
compounded by heavy rainfall during the rainy season.  
 
Prior to the Barclay Plan in 1904, Liberia had a dual political administration: the 
Americo-Liberian rule amongst the settler communities in the Coastal areas, and the 
customary rule which was exercised by the traditional authorities in the hinterlands. 
Efforts at extending the settler rule to the hinterlands were resisted by the indigenes 
until the Barclay Plan succeeded in bringing Liberia under one political 
administration. To ensure effective administration in areas where there were no 
chiefs in the hinterlands, chiefs were appointed and commissioned by the president. 
However, this system was abolished because it permitted the latter excessive 
control over the chiefs who are now elected and subject to the people as opposed 
to the president. The civil war impacted negatively on traditional authorities: many 
chiefs were killed, creating a knowledge gap in terms of the preservation of 
traditional values in the communities. Yet chiefs remain relevant in the post-war 
era. 
 
The research sought to define security from the perspective of the local people. This 
generated various responses from respondents. Issues such as lack of jobs, armed 
robbery, and the lack of education and food, among others, were identified as 
sources of insecurity. Respondents indicated that they prefer traditional authorities 
to respond to these security needs rather than the state administration and security 
agencies. However, it was noted that chiefs do not handle cases such as rape and 
murder which are handled by civil courts. However, in certain communities like 
Boje, courts are a last resort because this is a community in which the people see 
themselves as one extended family.   
 
Contrary to the view that traditional authorities are not accountable, it was noted 
that accountability mechanisms exist in the traditional set-up. For instance, bodies 
such as councils of elders and secret societies are often consulted by chiefs before 
decisions are made. Similarly, there have been instances where unpopular decisions 
by chiefs have been overturned by councils of elders and secret societies. Given this 
strong foundation in the traditional system of governance, especially where majority 
of the people subscribe more to traditional authorities, many political analysts have 
questioned the basis of the state and statehood in Africa.  
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It was noted that women and youth are excluded from key decision-making 
processes. This is because they are thought of as people who cannot handle sensitive 
information. However, the research revealed that women and youth play indirect 
roles in decision making. For instance, whenever there is a deadlock over a decision, 
the men are often asked to go home and sleep over the matter. In the process of 
reflecting over the issue, the men consult their wives and children for insights that 
inform their decisions. 
 
It was observed that the constitution of Liberia recognises both statutory and 
customary security arrangements. The traditional authority is as important as the 
secret society because most of the top-level government and public officials are 
members of secret societies. The decentralisation process has led to the election of 
chiefs at all levels.  
 
Discussions 
• It is perceived that the prevalence of female genital mutilation (FGM) in 
some of the communities is preventing the domestic violence bill from being 
passed.  
• In order to avoid civil crimes in these communities, issues such as rape and 
murder are defined in ‘traditional’ terms.  
• Is there any material difference between chiefs being appointed and 
elected?  
 
The appointment of chiefs by the president was a way of compromising their role. 
For this reason, many chiefs did not enjoy support from their people who reposed 
greater trust in elders than chiefs. For being monetised and politicised, the new 
process of electing chiefs is weakening their claim to being custodians of traditional 
norms and values. 
 
Session VIII: Roundtable Implications of the Project Findings for Policy 
and Future Research 
Chair: Eboe Hutchful 
Panellists were tasked to structure their contributions according to four questions: 
 
• What is the current policy position (if any) of your organisation on the issue 
of hybrid security and hybrid security governance? 
• Relatedly, what is the policy position on the role of non-state security and 
justice actors? To what extent is this in sync with regional and national 
realities?   
•  How are the research findings likely to influence your own thinking and 
work on SSR? 
• We welcome any other thoughts or ideas that you think should inform this 
dialogue.      
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This section is structured accordingly. 
 
Hamouda Kanu, African Union 
The ASSN did well to select unique examples that enabled the participation of 
national research institutions from countries like Somaliland. The hybrid roles of 
some non-state security actors (para-military militias) can sometimes be risky as it 
can lead to state regulation of these elements. Some states do this to accommodate/ 
integrate their loyal militias and mainstream them into state security apparatuses 
without considering issues of governance, the rule of law or any knowledge of 
national, regional or international legal frameworks. The example of the Janjaweed 
in Sudan who have evolved to become rapid deployment forces reporting directly to 
the national ministry of defence is a prime example. 
 
Suggestions to the ASSN: 
 
• Publish and disseminate the research papers to widen the benefit for those 
who are interested in such work. 
• Expand this research initiative, including to new contexts and themes like the 
phenomenon of cattle rustling by the Dahalo groups in southern Madagascar. 
More generally, more research is needed to highlight the interconnections 
between human security and state security. 
• Establish a standing research institution that can train, commission or 
encourage researchers to conduct this kind of research on the security sector 
on the continent. 
• Researchers may need to substitute the term hybridity with complementarity 
which is more acceptable to states as the former raises concerns about 
recognition by formal state security actors. 
 
Mpako Foaleng 
The crux of the UN and UNOWA’s current work on peace and security centres on the 
sustaining peace approach which highlights the importance of violence prevention 
in UN actions. Context (crucial), flexibility and other principles. The main pillars and 
most recurrent questions in UNOWA’s work on sustaining peace are SSR and 
reconciliation which are currently being piloting in West Africa in Burkina Faso and 
The Gambia through work on issues that can create conditions for peace.  
 
The relevance of the HSG research is multiple. First, it enhances in-depth 
understanding of UNOWA’s work contexts. Second, it enhances understanding about 
how to create the conditions for necessary but difficult discourses, such as the one 
impending in Côte d’Ivoire on the issues raised by the relevant papers.  
 
By way of next steps, there is a need to build acknowledgement of the hybrid nature 
of security governance without necessarily undermining the rationale behind a state-
centric approach and to table conversations like the one at hand in Burkina Faso 
about how it should handle its local equivalent of dozos whom the state sees as a 
threat but who are a safety source for local populations.  
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Overall, the HSG research will be very crucial to shaping narratives around security 
sector governance, and helps fills gaps in empirical knowledge about the prevalence 
of non-state security provisioning, especially at regional levels. 
 
Daoud Alwan, IGAD 
 
IGAD is troubled by the continuous wave of instability on the continent, much of 
which is based on the erosion of traditional values through globalisation. In this 
21st century, Africa, due to its unique and exceptional wealth in terms of natural 
and mineral resources and its inescapable geostrategic positioning is yet a pawn of 
external and rapacious international competitors.  
 
Issues such as these and others emanating from the HSG research is what will 
inform both research and policies developed by IGAD now and in the near future.  
 
Okey Uzoechina, ECOWAS 
ECOWAS has two key policy frameworks when it comes to security matters: the 2008 
conflict prevention framework (ECPF)which is its primary reference document for 
security governance, and its 2016 policy framework for security reform and 
governance. Both contain many provisions on working with a range of NSAs in 
security governance. Article 73(c) of the ECPF which is more pointed than 
comparable UN and AU requirements) mandates ECOWAS to develop, adopt, and 
facilitate the implementation of a regulatory framework for non-state armed groups 
(vigilantes, militias, private security, community watch groups, etc.) with a 
sanctions regime. It is not clear how well positioned all stakeholders are for this 
undertaking and how member-state contexts might augur for the task. The ASSN and 
the HSG research can accompany a process of thinking about how ECOWAS can 
achieve this goal in ways that are acceptable to states and beneficial to all 
concerned. ECOWAS needs help to determine, among other things what form such a 
framework might take and what the interactions could be between national and 
regional levels within it. 
 
Kathryn Nwajiaku, International Dialogue on Statebuilding and Peacebuilding, 
OECD 
The International Dialogue was set up in Ghana in 2008 with the aim of promoting 
effectiveness and national ownership in peacebuilding and statebuilding in countries 
affected by conflict and fragility (97 members from 20 countries).  
 
The New Deal, supported by 50 countries and organisations across the world 
including some HSG case study contexts (examples; Sierra Leone and Liberia), 
contains three core pillars/suggested priorities: 
 
• Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs): As foundation to MDGs, to 
identify priorities, guide funding decisions, and monitor progress. 
• FOCUS: New terms of engagement to support country-owned and -led 
transitions out of fragility. 
• TRUST: Commitments to provide aid and manage resources for better results 
in fragile states. 
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Human security is very central to the New Deal. It also forms part of the OECD’s 
ongoing reflection and dialogue around what has gone wrong with SSR in its member 
countries. A big challenge is the incapacity of donor systems to address issues like 
NSAs as not just oversight but substantive actors in their own rights While policy 
circles seem open to hybridity, conversations on it remain largely state centred to 
the exclusion of civil society. The HSG team needs to think about how to engage 
emerging opportunities at high policy levels to re-enact some of the discourses at 
the HSG meeting in ways that change practice. Coherence around questions like 
whose security is being served will be important to get people to listen with the 
intent of acting on what they hear about hybridity. 
Missak Kasongo, Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)  
ECCAS is concerned with three big issues: firstly, what future roles do traditional 
authorities have given the increasing pace of globalisation? This question is pertinent 
because globalisation appears to be taking away identity, thereby questioning the 
influence of traditional authorities. Secondly, whereas CSOs are increasingly gaining 
recognition and authority in SSR processes, it appears the role of traditional 
authorities is being diminished in the formal SSR process. Thirdly, private security 
companies are spreading rapidly (especially in Angola) but state regulation is not at 
pace with this development.  
 
 
Alice Hills, Durham University 
There is no doubt that politics will continue to drive security discourses among the 
regional and national policy community. The role that CSOs play in this discourse,  
however peripheral in the past, is beginning to manifest in ways that CSOs such as 
the ASSN cannot be ignored. Empirical research such as this will certainly generate 
interest within the policy community. The next steps should focus on how to develop 
advocacy around the project’s findings. 
 
Robin Luckham, Institute of Development Studies 
There is often a difficulty trying to determine specific outcomes of research of this 
nature where the objective seeks to more or less challenge the existing orthodoxy, 
and moreso in the security sector. Questions such as who exactly is doing this 
research and for what purpose and which audiences will always arise with this kind 
of endeavour. Is this effort geared toward producing a policy-based evidence and/or 
evidence-based policy research? Or is it about understanding the real security 
processes on the ground? Is this research aimed at providing analytical or 
methodological tool for understanding the security sector? Does it seek to contribute 
to the big debate on violence and power wherein we seek to interrogate the wider 
set of political and economic relations of security? Or is it about providing a voice 
to the poor and the vulnerable? There is the need to understand that the sources of 
transformation, change, dynamics and mutations of non-state actors often result 
from the ways states have responded to their own security threats. Such 
manifestations may present historical opportunities and breakpoints between state 
and non-state security actors. 
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David Leonard, University of California, Berkeley 
 
It seems old forms of authority which were entrenched, but had faced severe 
encroachment for the entry of colonisation have resurfaced in today’s debate. 
Therefore, does the penetration of non-state actors represent a new construct of 
authority? Although they do not perform the same roles, the re-engagement of local 
structures of governance into operation may present a dynamic struggle and clash 
between compromised values and uncompromised values. Today, arguments about 
the importance of secret societies, especially in the matrices of traditional 
authorities in Liberia and Sierra Leone means a revival of an important aspect of 
traditional values that has been long overlooked. But in another vein, can one accept 
the trend of the ‘new nationalism’ as bringing back the debate about ethnicity?  
 
Session IX: Remarks on the African Societal Analysis (ASA): an offshoot 
of the HSG Project 
Niagale Bagayoko, ASSN 
Overview 
 
With funding from the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (OIF), the 
ASSN set up the think tank African Societal Analysis/Analyse Sociétale Africaine 
(ASA) in October 2016 as a follow-on from the research programme Hybrid Security 
Governance in Africa: Implications for State Building (HSG). The ASA is a response 
to the necessity highlighted by the HSG project for more nuanced understandings of 
socio-cultural dynamics that are specific to the African continent and how they 
underpin various social and political happenings. The ASA’s key aim is to use key 
lessons from the HSG project to deepen and support security and development policy 
making and implementation by producing, on an ongoing basis, information and data 
designed to assist decision-makers to better grasp the sociological realities within 
which security and development governance in Africa are rooted. While there is no 
intuitive security link with some of the focal topics, the HSG findings show that the 
underlying dynamics make for a better appreciation of the environment and 
implementation of effective policies in Africa. 
 
ASA’s knowledge takes three main forms:  
 
• institutional mappings of the relationships between the formal and informal 
security institutions (short analytical notes) in both textual and visual 
format (Prezi presentations) are published weekly in French and English by 
email and posted on social networks as well as on the ASSN web site, 
http://africansecuritynetwork.org/assn/institutional-mapping/. The first 
institutional mappings, including those deriving from the HSG project, were 
launched in October 2016 with support from the OIF.  
• Tailored analyses (case studies) of the societal and cultural dynamics of 
today’s Africa. In this wise, a study on ‘The role of formal and informal 
institutions in resources critical to food security in the conflict region of 
Northern Mali’ has been commissioned by CARE International under USAID 
funding. 
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• Training via distance learning (e-learning resources, video supports, tele-
briefings via Visio conference or Skype, webinars) or/and on-site courses. 
 
Objectives 
By introducing new sociological parameters and incorporating often neglected 
indicators, the ASA’s objective is threefold: 
 
• Reinforce oversight and early warning systems, crisis prevention, conflict 
resolution, and mediation processes that are more rooted in local and 
societal contexts. 
• Support security and development policy formulation and implementation, 
based on a deeper understanding of local realities. 
• Connect decision-makers with a new community of African experts. 
Method and approach 
All of this is achieved by mobilising a network of locally based African experts on 
grassroots institutions and actors, with the objective of highlighting the role of non-
state actors, local or transnational networks, and so-called informal standards and 
practices, in six thematic areas, namely: 
 
• Traditional authorities, community membership and social 
solidarities/exclusion. 
• Religions and religious networks. 
• Gender. 
• Informal security and justice. 
• Social changes and emerging stakeholders. 
• African and transnational networks. 
 
HSG outputs and deliverables have so far been disseminated chiefly via the ASA 
(ASSN website, emails, Facebook, Twitter) in the form of policy briefs that highlight 
varied aspects of each case study and conform with both the IDRC and the ASA 
“institutional mapping” format. Five papers were published in English and French 




The ASA took off with an initial grant from the OIF of €20,000 to support work on 
four countries identified by the Directorate of Political Affairs and Democratic 
Governance, namely the Central African Republic, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Côte 
d'Ivoire. For each of these countries, institutional maps have been produced on 
religions and religious networks; traditional authorities, community affiliation and 
solidarity/social exclusion; social change and emerging players; and informal 
security and justice. Examples of specific topics include Fulani communities and 
Islam in Mali; the Moog Naaba and the Church in Burkina Faso; the Malinké and dozos 
in Côte d’Ivoire; and chieftaincy and the Zaraguinas in the Central African Republic. 
Twelve further mappings will be delivered by mid-November 2017 under a new 
agreement signed with the OIF in June 2017. Topics will include migration among 
West African countries; rap groups as youth mobilisers in Senegal; and the roles of 
women in terror groups. 
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Challenges and opportunities 
 
Although some ASA maps were well received and re-broadcasted by certain 
personnel of the United Nations and the University of Montreal (UQAM) through its 
Bulletin FrancoPaix, the ASA is looking to expand its consumption beyond the 1500 
contacts currently on its contact list. Part of this challenge is that for budgetary 
reasons, many ASA outputs are available only in French, despite a need to reach 
wider academic and policy audiences, particularly in the field of peacekeeping, 
security system reform promotion and the fight against terrorism in the the United 
Nations, the African Union, the European Union, and the OECD. To these ends, the 
ASA desires to mobilise more of the OIF and the IDRC’s dissemination networks. 
 
The ASA needs core support to attain its objectives, specifically in the areas of: 
• Communication: to broaden the reach of its institutional mappings. 
• Advocacy: to promote its novel societal approach to the study of security and 
development. 
• Translation: to facilitate wider access to all its knowledge products. 
• Fundraising: to help identify other potentially interested funders (especially 
international foundations). 
• Financial support.  
 
CONCLUSION AND CLOSING REMARKS 
Session IX: Entry point of hybridity in policy- 
Niagale Bagayoko, ASSN 
Linking the research themes and outputs to policy actions could follow certain key 
steps such as: 
• Assessment: this entails a comprehensive mapping of the security sector. 
• Training: focusing on peacekeeping missions.  
• Programming: research, policy engagements, and networking. 
• Monitoring and evaluation: how to take into account the role of informal 
actors, mobilise local expertise and local resources with an emphasis on deep 
knowledge vis-à-vis intelligible knowledge. 
• Communication: adopting the use of local language to communicate research 
findings to target audiences. 
• Need to deepen partnerships and create new projects on hybridity through 
South-South dialogue. 
 
Ramata Thioune, IDRC 
There is a great potential to support critical thinking and academic research that 
will contribute to better human security and development in Africa. This is why the 
IDRC took the initiative to collaborate with the ASSN in this endeavour. The research 
has revealed many interesting but very important perspectives that had long been 
ignored in the security sector discourse. Dissemination of the research publication 
should not only target policymakers but also technocrats. There are other thematic 
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areas that are being considered even though the HSG project has formally ended. 
Going forward, the IDRC will continue to seek avenues for developing analytical tools 
and concepts that will help improve human security and inclusivity. This will involve 
providing opportunities to build intellectual community and networking.  
 
Next steps: Outcomes and results 
• Though dissemination of the research findings remains crucial, more efforts 
should be made to engage policymakers. 
• There is the need to aggregate the different case studies in this research to 
produce one coherent narrative that will be used to engage policymakers. 
• There is the need to upscale this first stage of the research using more topical 
themes in the security sector. 
IDRC programming 
Currently, IDRC is realigning its programmatic areas with the view to focusing more 
on governance and justice. However, future themes will include: 
• Empowering vulnerable groups and providing safer spaces to vulnerable 
groups to escape from violence and conflicts. 
• Youth violence (youth involvement in violence), with sub-themes such as: 
o Radicalisation. 
o Access to land and forced migration, and  
o Sexual rights. 
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9.00 – 9.30.  
 
Session 1: 
Welcome and Introduction to the Workshop 
 
 






H.E. Heather Cameron 
Canadian High 
Commissioner to Ghana 
Ramata Thioune 
IDRC Programme Manager 
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 Sessions II-VII:  Presentation of Research Findings  
9:30-11:00 Session II:  
Chair:  Titilope Ajayi 
Bondo society, gender and police reform in Sierra 
Leone.  
Discussant(s) 
Gender, transitional justice and justice sector 

















Session III:  
Chair: Robin Luckham 
 
       Securing Pride: Sexuality, Security and the Post 
       Apartheid State  








12.30 – 13.30 Lunch  
13.30 – 15.00  
 
-     Session IV:  
Chair: Niagale Bagayoko 
 
      Formal organisation and decision-making 
processes of Ivorian defence and security forces.     
 












Mpako Foaleng (UNOWA) 
Maxime Ricard (UQAM) 
15:00-15:30                                        Coffee Break 
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15.30 – 17:00 -    Session V: 
Chair: Medhane Tadesse 
 
Somaliland 
Discussants:                                                             
 
 
Civil Defence forces and Chiefdom security 





Mohamed Abdi Omer 
Daoud Alwan (IGAD) 




Ernest Lartey (KAIPTC) 















-    Session VI:          
Chair: Thomas Jaye 
Safety and security of poor urban communities in 
Nigeria. 
 
      Policing Actors, Plural Processes and Hybridisation: 
Histories of Everyday Policing Practice in Central 







      Chair: Mpako Foaleng 
 
      Conclusion: Comparing Research Findings on 









Okey Uzoechina (ECOWAS) 




KAIPTC Research Team 















Session VII1: Roundtable: Implicationsof the                                          
:     Project Findings for Policy and Future Research 
Chair: Eboe Hutchful 
Panellists: 
Hamouda Kanu, African Union 
Mpako Foaleng, UNOWA 
Kathryn Nwajiaku, International Dialogue on 
Statebuidling and Peacebuilding. OECD 
Okey Uzoechina, ECOWAS 
Missak Kasongo, ECCAS 
Daoud Alwin, IGAD 
Kwesi Aning, KAIPTC 
Alice Hills, Durham University 
Robin Luckham (IDS)      
 
 
13:00-14:00                Lunch  
14:00-15:00 Session VIII: Roundtable: Political and                




15.00-15.30 Session IX: 
Remarks on the African Societal Analysis (ASA): an 
off-shoot of the HSG Project  
 
Niagale Bagayoko 
15:30-16:00 Concluding Remarks and Way Forward 
ASSN Project Co-Lead 




16:00 Conference closes                            
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